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VI. Conclusion
The circumstances surrounding a client's election of
execution is certainly complex and troubling for both the
defendant and the attorney who is trying to present a case
on his or her behalf. Consider the following statement that
was made in Lenhard v. Woff. "Bishop [the defendant] is an
individual who, for reasons I can fathom only slightly, has
chosen to forego his federal remedies. Assuming his com-
petence ... he should be free to choose. To deny him that
would be to incarcerate his spirit-the one thing that remains
free and which the state need not and should not
imprison."76 The very suggestion that "we", as a society,
should preserve a defendant's "spirit" by allowing him or
her to die at the hands of the state is deeply troubling.This
type of suggestion highlighting a move away from protect-
ing society's interest in non-arbitrary application of the
death penalty must be resisted. Several areas of the law per-
mit, if not demand, defense attorneys to persist in represen-
tation throughout a capital trial. Each stage of death penal-
ty litigation carries with it ethical considerations which pre-
sent defense attorneys with the difficult dilemma of choos-
ing between a client's desire to die and the attorney's per-
sonal and legal beliefs. It is valid to argue that the decision
to die is not specifically allocated to the defendant and
6Mitchell, supra note 29 at 670, n.204, citing Lenhard v. Wolff,
603 E2d 91, 94 (9th Cir. 1979) (Sneed,J., concurring).
therefore, counsel has an ethical obligation to pursue legal-
ly available channels in opposition to death. Admittedly,
the ultimate decision to plea, to appeal, or to fire the attor-
ney rests with the client. However, short of a definitive,
explicit decision, the attorney should proceed and preserve
the issues that may save the life of the defendant.
Even when the defendant does explicitly waive his or
her rights in a capital case, it is important for counsel to
continually assess the defendant's competency level. Due
to the finality and severity of a decision to die, the defense
attorney may have an obligation to question and ask for a
hearing to determine the defendant's current level of
competency. Finally, it is essential that the defense attor-
ney remind the court in any argument that he or she
makes that "death is different" and there is much more
than the defendant's preference at stake. Society, as a
whole, including those who will face the death penalty in
the future, has an interest in the non-arbitrary imposition
of the death penalty. Once a defendant knows that he or
she may face death, many psychological factors play into
the decision to die. Some even suggest that defendants
intentionally used the death penalty to complete a suicide
that he or she is unable to do alone." When these kinds of
virtually unknowable mental issues are at stake, it is best
to err on the side of process.
",White, supra note 2, at 874.
VIRGINIA'S "21 DAY RULE" AND ILLINOIS' DEATH ROW DEBACLE:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN CAPITAL JUSTICE
AND THE RELEVANCE OF INNOCENCE
BY: ANNE E. DUPREY
I. The 21 Day Rule
A. Its Contours
In Virginia, compelling evidence of the innocence of a
death row inmate usually generates a newspaper headline,
but it virtually never results in a court's consideration of the
evidence or exoneration and release of the inmate. Under
Rule 1.1 of the Supreme Court of Virginia (hereinafter"the
21 Day rule"), the Commonwealth grants capital defendants
who have been sentenced to death a period of only 21 days
from the date of the entry of final judgment to present new
evidence, including evidence of innocence.' This Rule pro-
'Rule 1.1 of the Supreme Court of Virginia, commonly
referred to as the "21 Day Rule," is entitled,"Finality of Judgments,
Orders and Decrees7 This Rule provides, in pertinent part, that
"[a]UI final judgments, orders, and decrees, irrespective of terms of
court, shall remain under the control of the trial court and subject
to be modified, vacated, or suspended for twenty-one days after
the date of entry, and no longer:'The Rule applies to civil and crim-
inal cases, alike, and makes no special provision for capital cases.
scribes the courts' consideration of newly discovered
evidence, which includes evidence borne of the appli-
cation of new forensic testing methods (such as DNA
analysis) to previously considered evidence. Under this
Rule, evidence that was wrongfully and unlawfully sup-
pressed by the prosecution constitutes "new evi-
dence."2 The Rule applies regardless of the magnitude
or potential import of a particular piece of evidence. In
essence, once the initial 21 day period has passed, the
existence of definitive, unassailable evidence of a death
row inmate's innocence is trumped by the premium
that Virginia has placed upon the finality of its judg-
ments. In Virginia, clear and persuasive evidence of a
death row inmate's innocence does not merit an evi-
dentiary hearing or a new trial. Instead, the 21 Day Rule
'Joe Jackson & June Arney, Sentenced to Die Without Fair
Trials Series: Dead End on Death Row?, VIRGINIAN-PILOT &
LEDGER-STAR, June 26, 1994, at 2, available in 1994 WL
6610599.
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mandates that when faced with such evidence, the
Commonwealth must march ahead with its plans for exe-
cution.
3
B. Its Dubious Origins and Elusive Rationale
The practical significance of the 21 Day Rule is belied
by its rather unremarkable origins. Delegate J. Samuel
Glasscock (D-Suffolk) was a member of the Virginia House
of Delegates at the time when the legislature sought to
ensure the Commonwealth's compliance with the mandate
of Furman v. Georgia.' He characterized the 21 Day Rule's
application to capital punishment cases as an oversight
rather than a deliberate policy decision, noting that as a gen-
eral proposition, 21 days was the standard period of time
required for a judge's order to become final. Delegate
Glasscock explained the origins of the 21 Day Rule as fol-
lows:"I don't think there was any conscious consideration
of the 21 days.The discussion.. .was,'Do we allow the death
penalty to be used at all and which offenses could be
included?' I don't recall any real discussion on...the 21-day
rule until recent years 5That lawmakers could have been so
indifferent (if not simply oblivious) to the implications of
the laws that they crafted themselves is appalling but not
unbelievable.
In fact, Delegate Glasscock's explanation seems entire-
ly plausible. Most states impose a time limit upon the abili-
ty of litigants to seek new trials based upon findings of new
evidence. Remarkably, Virginia stands alone in the United
States as the only state not to create an exception to the
rule in capital cases.
6
Present-day defenders of the 21 Day Rule ground their
defense in an administrative efficiency rationale along with
a wholesale belief in the accuracy of Virginia's criminal jus-
tice system. A letter to the editor'published by a Virginia
newspaper in 1997 typifies a popular argument in support
of the 21 Day Rule.The author stated," [t]he 21-day rule is an
3BecauseVirginia's laws ensure that new evidence of innocence
is never heard by a court (and thus, never transcribed onto a court
record), most of the sources for this article are extrajudicial. National
studies and local media accounts, which include interviews with
convicted capital defendants and their attorneys, Commonwealth's
Attorneys, and Virginia legislators, contain ample proof of the abject
failure ofVirginia's criminal justice system to accord its capital defen-
dants and death row inmates a very basic level of fairness. By keep-
ing new evidence of innocence out of court,Virginia has effectively
denied the legitimacy and concealed the existence of such evidence,
thus insulating from judicial and public scrutiny the malfeasance of
the Commonwealth's Attorneys and police.
'408 U.S. 238 (1972) (holding that the imposition of the death
penalty under then-existing statutory schemes violated the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against the imposition of cruel and
unusual punishment).
'See Jackson &Arney, supra note 2, at 17.
"Until April of 1994,Texas had a similar limit of 30 days. See
infra notes 59-71 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
constitutionality of the Texas rule and the subsequent judicial cir-
cumvention of that rule.
attempt, and a good one, to end the mountains of legalese
and the indefinite appeals that have become standard in
these cases .... The United States will have to either quickly
implement a swift, severe system of punishment or face the
worsening of the already apparent consequences of a soci-
ety gone soft on the criminal.7 This perspective fails to take
into account the high probability, if not certainty, that the 21
Day Rule holds the equivalent potential to end innocent
people's lives by denying access to Virginia's courts to death
row inmates with valid, viable claims and evidence of inno-
cence. It also betrays the author's presumption that the util-
ity and efficacy of punishment relates directly to the speed
of its administration and the degree of its severity.
Many of Virginia's Commonwealth's Attorneys and
politicians have voiced their support for the 21 Day Rule.
Delegate G. Steven Agee (R-Salem) complained that chang-
ing procedural rules such as the 21 Day Rule "would open
up a no man's land of inability to bring a capital case to a
conclusion."" House Majority Leader C. Richard Cranwell (D-
Roanoke County) echoed Delegate Agee's sentiments. Both
men indicated that they would prefer to attack the problem
by working to improve the quality of defense counsel in
capital cases.? Their approach exaggerates the problems
that would be posed by waiving the 21 Day Rule in capital
cases, fails to acknowledge the extremely high probability
that a change in the law would also result in the considera-
tion of valid claims and the exoneration of innocent death
row inmates, and overestimates the extent to which pro-
viding for competent counsel would correct for inaccuracy
and error in the disposition of capital cases. Reportedly, the
Attorney General's Office has continually voiced its strenu-
ous objections to altering the rule, contending that a
change in the Rule would result in endless litigation.10
C. Why Recent Efforts to Revise or Repeal It
Have Failed
1. Death Penalty Politics In Virginia and
Across the Country
A sampling of the newspaper headlines inVirginia in the
months and weeks leading to its 1997 gubernatorial election
reveals the degree to which crime control policy has been
politicized by legislators and, in turn, the manner in which
they seek to establish and use their reputations for being
"tough on crime" to stockpile political capital and ensure
victory. In recent years, policies designed to reduce crime by
exacting tougher penalties upon criminals have become a
dominant form of currency among political opponents. In
October of 1997, the opposing candidates for Attorney
Richard Wells, Letter to the Editor, VIRGINIAN-PILOT &
LEDGER-STAR,Jan. 15, 1997, at 1, available in 1997 VL 6391173.
'Tyler Whitley, Coleman Continues Federal Court Fight,
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General and Governor of Virginia, alike, waged an open, con-
tentious fight over their respective rankings on the "tough
on crime" scale."1 Although it is true that, as a general propo-
sition, Republican party candidates since Reagan have
sought to establish their superiority in this arena, both local
and national Democratic party candidates have demonstrat-
ed recently that the "tough on crime" stance can be an equal
opportunity platform.This is especially true in the context of
death penalty politics.As Governor of Arkansas, Bill Clinton
declined to halt the execution of a mentally retarded black
man who had lost a portion of his brain to a self-inflicted
gunshot wound.As President, he has expanded the range of
offenses capable of punishment by death and drastically
reduced the opportunities for postconviction relief in capi-
tal cases. Last year, Virginia's Democratic candidate for
Governor, then-lieutenant Governor Don Beyer, accused the
Republican candidate, now-Governor Jim Gilmore, of being
too lenient in his punishment of criminals, including rapists
and murderers, while he was Attorney General.
Many of the Virginia politicians who continue to support
the application of the 21 Day Rule in capital cases may do so
in response to political pressure to uphold their reputations
for being "tough on crime" 2 Being "tough on crime" in its
popular conception, is typically conflated with inflicting
increasingly severe punishment upon convicted criminals,
regardless of the actual utility of such an approach. Likewise,
defenders of the 21 Day Rule may believe that they are
responding to some vague public mandate to be tougher on
criminals. It may be true, for a combination of reasons, that
when the issue is marketed in a form so abstract and nebulous
as to be virtually without content, manyVirginians believe that
politicians should be "tough on crime." However, an examina-
"They competed for this valuable designation by making pro-
posals and counter-proposals ranging from Beyer's proposal to
"give victims of crimes rights in plea agreements," to now-
Governor Gilmore's proposal to render illegal the recruitment of
"a young person into a criminal gang."Laura LaFayTough on Crime
at ElectionTime: Candidates Find a Sure-Fire Strategy in Appeal for
Votes, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, Oct. 29, 1997, at 4-5,
available in 1997 WL 7306522.The author of that election-week
article noted that most of the crime-related proposals proffered by
the candidates did not differ substantively from crime control poli-
cies already in place.
2In many cases, that pressure is a product of their own cre-
ation. In recent years, politicians have increasingly sought to
manipulate, or, at the very least, shape public opinion as to what
their legislative mandate should be via polling, campaign speech-
es, and advertisements. Last October, numerous newspaper head-
lines trumpeted the popularity of Gilmore's now-notorious car tax
plan and his concomitant rise in the polls. Polls indicated that the
car tax was, suddenly, a top legislative priority forVirginians. Marc
Mauer, the director of the Sentencing Project, explained the phe-
nomenon as it relates to the formulation of crime control policy as
follows:"Now what we have essentially is political pollsters devel-
oping an issue that may or may not be a problem, or that may or
may not be on the minds of the public.And then, because some-
thing has been a campaign slogan, the winning candidate feels
obligated to put it into practice. It's kind of a weird way to make
policy" See LaFay, supra note 11 at 9.
tion of the many factors that might explain the prevalence of
that vague sentiment is unnecessary here, for the will of the
people with respect to the 21 Day Rule is quite clear.A 1996
poll by the Center for Survey Research at Virginia Tech found
that an overwhelming majority of Virginians-74 percent-
oppose the 21 Day Rule while only 22 percent support this
law.The Virginia legislature's refusal to revise or repeal the 21
Day Rule directly contradicts the will of the people.
2. A Sampling of Recent Bills to Revise or
Repeal the 21 Day Rule
Virginia's General Assembly first examined the 21 Day
Rule in 1992, in the wake of the controversy surrounding
Roger Keith Coleman's execution on May 20th of that year.
3
The House of Delegates created a subcommittee of the
House Courts of Justice Committee to consider possible
alternatives to the 21 Day Rule.' 4 Since that time, the
Virginia legislature has considered a number of proposals to
revise the 21 Day Rule but has accepted none.
In 1994, the subcommittee of the House Courts of
Justice Committee unanimously decided that a change in
the law should be drafted which would allow new evidence
to be heard in court beyond the 21 day period. 5 One mem-
ber of the subcommittee, Delegate C. Richard Cranwell (D-
Roanoke County), explained, "I wouldn't want to appear
soft on crime. But if a condemned person can show inno-
cence, as bloodthirsty as I am ... I think we ought to give
them another bite at the apple [in court]f'
6
Delegate Chip Woodrum (D-Roanoke) sponsored House
Bill 213, which, if passed, would have permitted death row
inmates to petition for a hearing "at any time" if there exist-
ed "new discovered evidence that establishes a significant
probability that the prisoner is actually innocent."7 Delegate
Woodrum stated, "As long as we have the death penalty in
this state, we have to make it as fail-safe as possible. I don't
want to turn anyone loose that is deserving of death - these
are vile people who committed unspeakable acts. But I think
the ultimate horror would be for the state to execute some-
one who is not guilty of the crime'" The Attorney General's
Office opposed the legislation based upon its concern that
death row inmates seeking to postpone their executions
"Coleman's attorneys argued that the 21 Day Rule had pre-
vented them from presenting new evidence that might have exon-
erated Coleman. See infra notes 84-89 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the circumstances surrounding Coleman's execution.
14Tyler Whitley, Should Death Penalty Process Be Altered?
Prosecutors, Defense Attorneys Don't Agree, RICHMOND TIMES-
DISPATCH,Aug. 7, 1992, available in 1992 WL 7710946.
"Frank Green, 'New Evidence Bill' to Be Drafted: Some Want
Courts, Not Governor, to Make Final Ruling, RICHMOND TIMES-
DISPATCH,Jan. 4., 1994, at 3, available in 1994 WL 7113262.
'6Id.
"See Jackson &Araey, supra note 2 at 18.
1Id. Delegate Woodrum further explained,"[s]ome of us kind
of feel there's a basic human right not to be executed if you're
innocent? See Green, supra note 15 at 1.
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would abuse the appeals process. 9 The House Courts of
Justice Committee approved the bill. However, as the leg-
islative session neared its end, the Senate Courts of Justice
Committee defeated the bill.
20
In 1998, the House of Delegates considered two bills-
House Bill 606 and House Bill 933-to revise the 21 Day
Rule in the context of capital cases. House Bill 933 provid-
ed, in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any rule of the Supreme Court, a
prisoner may, at any time, present a bill of review as
a civil proceeding to the circuit court which
entered the order sentencing a prisoner to death,
provided the bill of review alleges that there exists
newly discovered evidence, not known by the pris-
oner or his trial counsel at the time the prisoner
was tried upon the charge resulting in the sentence
of death, which establishes a significant probability
that the prisoner is actually innocent of the crime
for which the sentence was imposed.'
The House sent this bill to a committee and then a sub-
committee, where it was defeated.
If enacted, House Bill 606 would have provided for a"capi-
tal case bill of review, whereby death row prisoners or prison-
ers whose death sentences have been commuted to life impris-
onment by the Governor could present a bill of review as a civil
proceeding alleging newly discovered evidence of actual inno-
cence.' If the prisoner could meet the specified standards, the
court would grant the bill of reviewAfter the House referred this
bill to the Committee for Courts of Justice, which in turn
referred it to a sub-committee, the sub-committee members
deferred further consideration of the bill until 1999. Neither of
these bills would have created clear pathways for death row pris-
oners who wish to present new evidence of innocence to
Virginia state courts, but both would have made access to the
state courts a realistic possibility for some death row inmates.
II. The Death Row Debacle in Illinois: An Instructive
Example
A. The Simple Truth: Illinois Has Freed Nine
and Executed Eleven
The recent death row debacle in Illinois offers an
instructive example of the potentially chilling implications
of the 21 Day Rule.The simple truth is remarkable. Since the
reinstatement of the death penalty in 1977, the State of
'9See Green, supra note 15 at 2 & Ruth S. Intress, Panel
Approves Bill on New Evidence, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH,
Feb. 15, 1994, at 2, available in 1994 WL 7113819.
29 yler Whitley, Deadline Prompts Legislative Session: Crime,
Punishment Drive Bills'Agenda, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH,
Mar. 7,1994, at 4, available in 1994 WL 7109446.
2Delegates Almand, Callahan, Darner, Deeds, Grayson, Plum,
Van Yahres, and Watts sponsored House Bill 933.
'Delegates Almand, Darner, Melvin, Plum, Robinson, Van
Landingham,VanYahres, and Woodrum sponsored House Bill 606.
Illinois has freed nine death row inmates and executed
eleven (only two more).3 The stories of the nine men freed
from death row share much in common. Some of the con-
victions stemmed from coerced, perjurious statements from
key prosecution witnesses, several with low IQS. Several of
the cases involved prosecutorial and police misconduct,
including the suppression of exculpatory evidence. Some
involved key testimony which incriminated the defendants
offered by witnesses later proven to be partially or solely
responsible for the capital crimes which they had attrib-
uted to other people. Several of the defendants were sub-
jected to multiple retrials by stubborn state's attorneys who
were cognizant of the defects in their cases but intent upon
obtaining convictions. In a few of the cases, DNA testing of
"old" evidence exonerated the defendants. Six of the cases
involved minority defendants who were charged with the
commission of interracial murders. Finally, as many com-
mentators have observed, eight of the nine cases were
resolved in favor of the condemned prisoners not as a result
of diligent, ethical prosecutors, vigilant courts, or any other
forces within the system but because of the work of public
interest attorneys and organizations (including the
Appellate Defender's Office), law professors, media com-
mentators, and, in one case involving two death row
inmates, undergraduate journalism students.
Prior to 1996, the letter of the Illinois law somewhat
restricted the ability of convicted prisoners to present new
evidence of innocence in court.24 However, judges and prose-
2'Until November of 1997, the State of Illinois had executed
fewer death row inmates (eight) than it had released (nine). See
David Protess & Rob Warden, Nine Lives, CHICAGO TRIBUNE,
August 10, 1997, available in 1997 WL 3576969, for a succinct
description of the events leading up to the conviction and exon-
eration of each of the nine men.Additionally, three more death row
inmates have been granted new trials in the last nine months, and
it is widely believed that one of the men, Ronald Jones, will
become the tenth innocent man to be released from death row by
the State of Illinois. For an account of the circumstances sur-
rounding the impending retrial of Ronald Jones, see Andrew
Martin, New Trial Likely in 1985 Murder of Young Mother: DNA
Test Gives Death Row Inmate Hope, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, July 9,
1997, available in 1997 WL 3565914 and Eric Zorn, DNA
Evidence Continues to Cast Doubt on Retrial, CICAGO TRI-
BUNE, Nov. 27, 1997, available in 1997 WL 3614947. See infra
notes 57-58 and accompanying text for a discussion ofJones' case.
For information on the Illinois Supreme Court's decision to grant
new trials to Earl Hawkins and Nathson Fields, see Maurice Possley,
2 Rukns Convicted in '93 by Corrupt Judge to Get a New Trial,
CHICAGOTRIBUNE,Jan. 30,1998,available in 1998WL 2820001.
2
'Under 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2-1202(c) (West 1992), a con-
victed defendant may present a claim of newly discovered evi-
dence of innocence by making a motion for a new trial within 30
days. Under 735 II1. Comp. Stat. 5/2-1401(a) (West 1992), "[relief
from final orders and judgments, after 30 days from the entry there-
of, may be had upon petition... :Under subsection (c),"the petition
must be filed not later than 2 years after the entry of the order or
judgment. Time during which the person seeking relief is under
legal disability or duress or the ground for relief is fraudulently con-
cealed shall be excluded in computing the period of 2 years:'
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cutors generally seemed to concur with defense attorneys on
the desirability of allowing convicted defendants with valid
claims of innocence access to the state's courts to present
those claims. The states' courts had demonstrated an unwa-
vering amenability to granting hearings to evaluate newly dis-
covered evidence so as to determine whether that evidence
warranted a new trial. 21 In People v. Washington,26 the Illinois
Supreme Court formalized that tacit understanding and creat-
ed an official mechanism for the state courts' review of new
evidence of innocence, or what it deemed "'free standing'
claim[s] of innocence; presented by condemned prisoners in
Post-Conviction HearingAct proceedings.' The court stated,
"We believe that no person convicted of a crime should be
deprived of life or liberty given compelling evidence of actu-
al innocence:' Noting that the legislature had provided very
few avenues for raising such claims, aside from the mecha-
nism of executive clemency, the court held "as a matter of
Illinois constitutional jurisprudence that a claim of newly dis-
covered evidence showing a defendant to be actually inno-
cent of the crime for which he was convicted is cognizable as
a matter of due process:'3 The court explained that the evi-
dence of innocence must be "new, material, noncumulative,
and most importantly,'of such conclusive character' as would
'probably change the result on retrial.' 31 By linking the right
to present newly discovered evidence in court to state con-
stitutional due process rights, the court ensured that all defen-
dants in Illinois would receive more than the mere base-line
protection afforded by the United States Constitution.
2Judges had also demonstrated a willingness to interpret cre-
atively the state's law regarding the performance of new scientific
tests upon old evidence so as to allow the tests more often than
the law, strictly interpreted, might allow. See infra notes 51-52 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the State's new law regard-
ing the availability of DNA tests.
26665 N.E.2d 1330 (1996).
17Under 725 11. Comp. Stat. 5/122-1 (West 1992) (hereinafter
the Post-Conviction Hearing Act),"[a]ny person imprisoned in the
penitentiary who asserts that in the proceedings which resulted in
his or her conviction there was a substantial denial of his or her
rights under the Constitution of the United States or of the State
of Illinois or both may institute a proceeding under this article.'
Prior to 1996, defendants who wished present newly discovered
evidence of innocence in a Post Conviction Hearing Act proceed-
ing could do so only in a narrow context-they had to allege and
prove the State's complicity in securing or allowing false testimo-
ny at trial. All other defendants had to proceed under section 2-
1401. See supra note 24.
28Washington, 665 N.E.2d at 1332.
2Id. at 1336.
3Id. at 1337. The court grounded its decision in the state con-
stitution's procedural and substantive due process rights. It stated,
"[iln terms of procedural due process, we believe that to ignore
such a claim would be fundamentally unfair ... Imprisonment of
the innocent would also be so conscience-shocking as to trigger
operation of substantive due process: Id. at 1336.
3 Wasington, 665 N.E.2d at 1337 (quoting People v. Silagy,
507 N.E.2d 830 (1987)).
B. Specific Examples
1. The Misguided Search for Jeanine
Nicarico's Killers
The details surrounding the prosecution, conviction,
and exoneration of four of the nine innocent men freed by
Illinois illustrate the range of factors that have undermined
public confidence in Illinois' capital justice system.The first
case involved two young Latino men who were sentenced
to death for the widely-reported kidnaping, rape, and mur-
der of a young girl.
On February 25, 1983, Jeanine Nicarico, a ten year-old
white girl from Naperville, Illinois, was kidnaped from her
home. She had been at home, instead of school, that day
because she was sick. Police found her body several days
later, and a forensic examination revealed that she had been
raped and bludgeoned to death.32 This event inspired feel-
ings of horror, shock, sadness, and fear, which reverberated
throughout the serene suburbs of Chicago. Many suburban
residents felt deprived and angered by the loss of their
sense of security, safety, and enclosure.They worried about
the safety of their children and craved assurance that their
way of life had not been irreversibly altered.33
Local police quickly found two Latino suspects,
Alejandro Hernandez, an 18 year-old with a low IQ and,
according to at least one newspaper account, a"propensity
for fantasy," and his friend, Rolando Cruz, and served them
up to a public anxious for answers.1 When questioned
about the crime by police,who had received an anonymous
telephone tip, Hernandez had explained that he was not
involved in the crime but that a few of his friends might
possess relevant information. The prospect of a $10,000
reward reportedly motivated Hernandez (and later Cruz) to
become involved in conversations with the police about
what had happened. Police said that Cruz had revealed to
them details of the crime that had come to him in what was
alternatively reported to be a "dream" or "vision; but they
did not make any recording of the statement." A jury con-
victed the men and sentenced them to death.
Soon after the men were sentenced to death, Brian
Dugan confessed to six rape-murders. In the course of plea
discussions, he confessed to the abduction, rape, and mur-
der of Jeanine Nicarico and offered details of the crime not
known to the public. In 1988, Hernandez and Cruz were
granted new trials, and the state's attorney's office re-tried
them rather than pursuing charges against Dugan.The court
deemed Dugan's statement inadmissible as hearsay and
Dugan refused to testify because the state refused to waive
the death penalty. The men were again convicted, with
32People v. Cruz, 643 N.E.2d 636,639 (Il. 1994).
313Tese observations are based upon news reports of the
crime as well as the author's own recollections as a ten-year old
girl who lived in a neighboring suburb.
mSee Protess &Warden, supra note 23 at 5.
35See People v. Cruz, 643 N.E.2d 636 at 641, for a detailed
description of the alleged content of Cruz's "dream" statement.
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Hernandez receiving 80 years in prison and Cruz being sen-
tenced to death.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed their
convictions and sentences.
Cruz's fate changed when, after volunteer lawyers and
a local newspaper columnist, Eric Zorn, had adopted his
cause, the retirement of several judges changed the compo-
sition of the Illinois Supreme Court. Cruz was granted a
rehearing and then another new trial. By this time, DNA
tests had been performed which showed that neither
Hernandez nor Cruz had raped Nicarico but did link Dugan
to her murder.
At Cruz's retrial, a police officer admitted to lying under
oath to the same judge about the vision statement. The
judge indicated that he had previously entertained some
doubt as to the viability of that "dream" statement and that
he was finally convinced that there had been no such state-
ment. On November 3,1995, the Judge found that the pros-
ecution had not shown either that Cruz was involved in the
crime or that Dugan was not the sole perpetrator, and he
directed a verdict of not guilty. After twelve years which
bore witness to perjurious and inconsistent testimony,
undisclosed deals, police and prosecutorial misconduct,
revealing DNA tests, and much litigation, the judge declared
Cruz innocent and set him free. Prosecutors indicated that
this decision would not in any way alter their plans to re-try
Hernandez, but they dropped the charges against him on
the eve of the trial."
2. The Ford Heights Four
Another remarkable case involved four black defen-
dants (popularly dubbed "the Ford Heights four") who had
been convicted for the 1978 abduction and murder of a
recently engaged white couple. Three undergraduate jour-
nalism students at Northwestern University working under
the direction of their professor succeeded in freeing all four
men roughly eighteen years after the commission of the
murder for which they had been convicted.3 7 Two of the
men had been sentenced to death and the other two to
lengthy prison terms.
3n 1996, a grand jury levied charges of perjury, obstruction
of justice, official misconduct, and conspiracy against four police
officers and three former prosecutors who had participated in the
Nicarico case. See Ted Gregory & Maurice Possley, Indictments
Tear at Prosecutorial Teflon: DuPage Charges Outline
Conspiracy Against Cruz, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Dec. 13, 1996,
available in 1996 WL 2741251. Soon after this case ended, the
lead prosecutorJim Ryan, was elected Illinois Attorney General.
37Chicago Tribune columnist Eric Zorn wrote a series of arti-
cles about the Ford Heights Four and the students' work on their
case spanning from mid-February through the summer of 1996,
after the men's exoneration. For a succinct summary of the stu-
dents' six-month investigation (which led to the release of the
Ford Heights four), see Eric Zom, Students'Legwork Went Further
Than LongArm of Law, CHICAGOTRIBUNE,June 11, 1996,avail-
able in 1996WL 2680106.
On May 12, 1978, police found the bodies of Larry
Lionberg and Carol Schmal in East Chicago Heights (now
Ford Heights), Illinois, a predominantly black suburb. They
had been abducted from a service station in Homewood,
Illinois, a predominantly white suburb. Forensic reports
indicated that Schmal had been raped repeatedly and shot
twice in the head and that Lionberg had been shot in the
head and the back. Soon after, the police interviewed Paula
Gray, a 17 year old who lived in the vicinity of where the
bodies were found. She implicated Kenneth Adams,William
Rainge, and Dennis Williams in the crimes and later impli-
cated Vermeal Jimerson, as well. Several days later, based
upon Gray's testimony, a grand jury indicted Adams,
Jimerson, Rainge, and Williams for the crimes. Gray, whose
IQ fell somewhere within the range of 57 to 64, could nei-
ther read, write, nor tell time. She also implicated herself in
the crimes.-
Gray stated that the group had taken the couple to a ware-
house and placed Schmal upstairs and Lionberg downstairs. She
claimed that she had held a lighter to illuminate the room while
the males raped Schmal. She said that Williams shot Schmal in
the head and that Wiliams and Rainge shot and killed lonberg
at the nearby creek to which they had taken him.1
A month later, at the preliminary hearing, Gray recant-
ed her grand jury testimony and denied both knowing any-
thing about the crimes and having any involvement in the
crimes. Because the remaining evidence was insufficient to
convict Jimerson, the charges against him were dismissed.
The other three men were tried and convicted on varying
combinations of murder, kidnaping, and rape charges based
upon the testimony of a man who stated that he had seen
them near the murder scene close to the time of the com-
mission of the crime.4 Gray was subsequently charged with
perjury, in addition to rape and murder, and upon convic-
tion on all three charges, was given a lengthy prison term.
Gray, Williams, and Rainge sought and received habeas
relief. Following the reversal of her convictions, Gray agreed
once again to testify for the State against Jimerson,Wiliams,
and Rainge.The State then re-tried Jimerson.4'
At Jimerson's trial, Gray again implicated herself and
the four men.When defense counsel tried to cross-examine
Gray with her statements denying knowledge of or involve-
ment in the crime at the preliminary hearing, Gray claimed
to have no recollection of that testimony. Gray also denied
that the State had promised her anything in exchange for
her testimony. The State presented no forensic evidence
that definitively linked Jimerson to the crime.Jimerson pre-
sented an alibi defense.The jury found Jimerson guilty on
both counts of murder, and the trial judge sentenced
Jimerson to death.42 In a separate retrial,Williams was once
again convicted and sentenced to death .
3
1"See generally People v.Jimerson, 652 N.E.2d 278 (IWl. 1995).
39Jimerson, 652 N.E.2d at 280.
4'See Protess &Warden, supra note 23 at 9.
4!imerson, 652 N.E.2d 278 at 280.
421d. at 281.
43People v. Williams, 588 N.E.2d 983 (II. 1992).
Page 88 - Capital Defense Journal, Vol. 10, No. 2
The Supreme Court of Illinois initially affirmed both
verdicts and sentences. However, in May of 1995,Jimerson
presented evidence to the supreme court that the State had
knowingly used perjured evidence by allowing Gray to tes-
tify that she had not received anything in exchange for her
testimony. In fact, the State had promised to drop the mur-
der charges against Gray in return for her testimony against
Jimerson.The supreme court granted Jimerson a new trial,
and in January of 1996, Judge Sheila Murphy released
Jimerson on bond.4 At that point, the prosecution did not
abandon its plans to re-try Jimerson.
That January, a journalism professor from North-
western University named David Protess assigned three stu-
dents in his investigative reporting class to look into the
case of the Ford Heights Four. Over the course of the next
several months, those three young women unraveled the
prosecution's case, exonerating the Ford Heights Four and
leading police to the actual culprits.45 In February, the stu-
dents met with Gray in her apartment and elicited from her
a statement that the police had coerced her into falsely
implicating the four men.The professor conducted a follow-
up interview with Gray, who in turn, told her story to a
newspaper reporter, Eric Zorn, and Channel 5, the NBC affil-
iate in Chicago. Gray confessed that she had lied. She said,
"They [the police] kept putting pressure on me, saying
'[w]e know you know [the four men] did it.They told me
if I didn't tell the truth I would go to prison. I was scared 46
She also indicated that the police had taken her to the
crime scene and coached her on details of the crime while
saying,"[tihis is what happened, isn't it?"47 Media accounts
of Gray's recantation generated public pressure which led
the Cook County State's Attorney's Office to abandon its
objection to new DNA testing. 8
Next, the three students found copies of old police
investigatory notes that implicated four other men in the
murders of Lionberg and Schmal. The police had never
interviewed any of the four men. The students followed
these unpursued leads, and the three suspects who were
still living ultimately confessed. In June of 1996, the results
of the DNA tests exonerated the Ford Heights Four.A Cook
County judge released Adams, Rainge, and Williams that
month (Jimerson had already been released on bond), and
the State dropped all charges against the men. Additional
DNA tests corroborated the confessions of the three new
suspects, who are presently serving life sentences in prison
for the murders. 9
"Man Freed While Awaiting New Trial: Former Death Row
Inmate Was Convicted in 1978 Rape, Murders, PEORIA JOUR-
NAL STAR,Jan. 7,1996, available in 1996 WL 6949242.
"See Zorn, supra note 37.
"'Eric Zom, Shaky to Begin With, '78 Murder Case Just Got a
Lot Flimsier, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Feb. 13,1996, at 4, available in
1996 WL 2642974.
4Id.
IsSee Zorn, supra note 37 at 5.
"Protess and Warden, supra note 23. See generally Zom,
supra note 37.
B. Public Debates Inspired by the Death Row
Debacle
As a result of the rash of releases from Illinois' death
row in the last several years, Illinois public opinion seems
to have settled into two schools of thought. Some residents,
media commentators, attorneys, and scholars believe that
the recent exoneration of the nine men reveals significant,
fundamental flaws in Illinois' capital justice system. Others,
including the Cook County State's Attorney's Office (which
handled several of the cases), believe that the release of the
innocent men provides unequivocal proof that Illinois'
criminal justice system works.5 0 Neither of those arguments
bear any relevance to the imposition of the death penalty in
Virginia, for Virginia simply has no system in place to han-
dle the contingency of newly discovered evidence of inno-
cence. A majority of the nine men in Illinois secured their
freedom via the presentation of evidence that would be
deemed "new" by Virginia. It is utterly appalling to consider
what the fate of those nine men would have been had their
lawyers been working under the constraints of Virginia's
statutory system and, in particular, the 21 Day Rule.
The general public debate in Illinois concerning the
State's imposition of the death penalty quickly spawned
several key policy initiatives. The first involved a specific
proposal by two very conservative members of the Illinois
General Assembly, Representative Peter Roskam (R-
Wheaton) and Senator Ed Petka (R-Plainfield), to allow
defendants to secure forensic testing on evidence that was
not subject to such testing at the time of trial because of the
unavailability of certain technology. Representative Roskam
explained,"Everybody wants to be tough on crime, but you
want to make sure you've got the right guy.There's nobody
who wants an innocent person in prison. If there is an inno-
cent person behind bars, there's a perpetrator at large:'5
Governor Jim Edgar signed into law, effective January 1,
1998, Chapter 725,Act 5,Title VI,Article 116, which allows
defendants to make such motions without time limita-
tions .5 Another public debate revolves around the possibili-
ty of placing a moratorium upon the imposition of the
death penalty so that the system may be probed and the
source of the errors discovered. On July 15, 1997, a broad
coalition of lawyers, judges, and legal organizations, along
with several religious leaders, submitted an amicus curae
5'See infra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
5Christi Parsons & Eric Ferkenhoff, DNA Could Be Litmus
Test for Justice: Bill Pushing Retroactive Checks Wins Backers,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE,Apr. 22,1997, available in 1997WL 3541461.
2Under Chapter 725,Act 5,Title VI,Article 116, the defendant
must make a prima facie case that"identity was the issue in the trial
which resulted in his or her conviction; and the evidence to be test-
ed has been subject to a chain of custody sufficient to establish that
it has not been substituted, tampered with, replaced, or altered in
any material aspect."The statute further mandates that the trial court
grant the motion upon a determination that the testing has the "sci-
entific potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence material-
ly relevant to the defendant's assertion of actual innocence."
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brief to the Illinois Supreme Court requesting a one-
year moratorium on executions.The coalition requested
the creation of a special commission that would seek to
discover how and why Illinois had sentenced at least
nine innocent men to death. This proposal drew the
support of many legislators and media commentators,
including the editorial staffs of decidedly conservative
newspapers like the Chicago Sun-Times and the Peoria
Journal Star." The Cook County state's attorney's office
responded with the tired argument that the exonera-
tion of the nine men proved that Illinois' system
works.54 In September of 1997, the Illinois Supreme
Court issued an order refusing to accept the brief."
However, the rejection of this brief did not end the
debate. Illinois newspapers have continued to publish
articles and editorials that feed and reflect the public
debate concerning the accuracy and legitimacy of the
state's capital justice system.
5 6
In fact, the case of a tenth death row inmate now
believed to be innocent captured the media's attention
in the latter half of 1997. Ronald Jones, an indigent,
homeless black man, spent eight years on death row for
a 1985 rape-murder.When the results of new DNA tests
were released in July of 1997, they showed that neither
Jones nor the victim's fianc6 had intercourse with the
victim, which suggested that another person altogether
was responsible for the crime.57 Incredibly, prosecutors
have indicated thus far that they will retry Jones, but
they have agreed not to seek the death penalty because
they "don't have the moral certainty anymore" as to
"See Editorial, Probe Illinois Justice, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES,
July 16, 1997, available in 1997 WL 636004 & Editorial, Death
Penalty Moratorium: If Studying Capital Punishment Buys
Peace of Mind, Public Confidence, It's Worth Delaying
Executions, PEORIA JOURNAL STAR, July 21, 1997, available in
1997WL 7670165.
"Ky Henderson,How Many Innocent InmatesAre Executed?,
HUM. RTS., Fall 1997, at 10.
"Death Penalty Ban Rejected by High Court, CHICAGO TRI-
BUNE, Sept. 10, 1997, available in 1997 WL 3587125.
"Several days before the State's planned double execution
of Walter Stewart and Durlyn Eddmonds in November of 1997,
the Chicago Tribune published an editorial that urged the
Governor to initiate a moratorium on the imposition of the
death penalty by granting a stay. The editorial stated, "[y]ou
don't have to be an opponent of capital punishment to con-
clude that in death penalty cases, something is obviously wrong
with the way the criminal justice system in Illinois works. In
recent years, nine different men convicted of murder and sen-
tenced to die here have been exonerated-nine men who, with-
out some struck of luck, could all have been put to death by the
state.... Chance and factors unrelated to guilt and the severity
of the crime continue to play far too big a role in the choice of
who gets selected for Illinois' ultimate sanction." Editorial,
Governor, Stay This Execution, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Nov. 14,
1997, at 2, available in 1997WL 3611416.
57Sre Martin, supra note 23 & Zom, supra note 23.
whether Jones was, indeed, the culprit. 8
M. Why Virginia Must Repeal the 21 Day Rule
A. Legal Requirements and Practical
Considerations
1. U.S. Constitutional Protections: The
Supreme Court's Implicit Mandate
A recent decision by the Supreme Court suggests that
the application of Virginia's 21 Day Rule to capital cases
may violate the constitutional requirements of due process
and fundamental fairness. Although the holding is not
promising on its face, upon closer examination, the frac-
tured opinion suggests the unconstitutionality of the Rule.
In Herrera v. Collins,59 the Court considered the defendant's
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment challenges to the con-
stitutionality of a Texas rule which prohibited defendants
(including those sentenced to death) from filing a motion
for a new trial based upon new evidence more than 30 days
after the imposition of a sentence.60A majority of the Court
held that Herrera's claim of innocence based upon newly
discovered evidence did not entitle him to federal habeas
relief.6 Several members of the Court indicated that the
overwhelming evidence of Herrera's guilt substantially
"See Zorn, supra note 18 at 3.According to Rule 3.8 of the
American Bar Association Annotated Model Rules of Professional
Conduct and long-standing rules regarding the special responsi-
bilities of prosecutors, the principal objective of prosecutors
should always be to seek justice. Comment 1 states,"[a] prosecu-
tor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply
that of an advocate' In Berger v. US., 295 U.S. 78,88 (1935), the
Court held," [The prosecutor] is the representative not of an ordi-
nary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation
to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at
all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not
that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. In light of
the prosecutors' lack of "moral certainty" that Ronald Jones was
guilty and the overwhelming evidence of his innocence, their plan
to re-prosecute Jones is inconsistent with their ethical duties.
19506 U.S. 390 (1993) (holding that death row inmate's claims
of innocence based upon newly discovered evidence did not enti-
tie him to federal habeas relief). In State ex rel Holmes v. Court of
Appeals for the Third District, 885 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. Crim. App.
1994) (en banc), the court lifted a death row inmate's stay of exe-
cution but set forth a process by which death row inmates in
Texas could present claims of actual innocence. The court held
that habeas corpus was the appropriate vehicle for the presenta-
tion of claims of actual innocence by death row inmates and estab-
lished the following threshold standard for such claims:"whether
the newly discovered evidence, if true, would create a doubt as to
the efficacy of the verdict to the extent that it undermines our
confidence in the verdict and that it is probable that the verdict
would be different!' State ex rel Holmes, 885 S.W2d at 398.
"Herrera, 506 U.S. 390 at 400.
6"ld.
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influenced their decision to deny his request for a new
hearing. The Court noted that the traditional function of
habeas courts is to ensure that defendants are not impris-
oned in violation of the Constitution and "not to correct
errors of fact.""' In the context of Virginia's 21 Day Rule, the
Court's statement leaves unresolved the crucial issue of
who shall correct errors of fact in cases originating in
Virginia.
The Court continued,"This is not to say that our habeas
jurisprudence casts a blind eye toward innocence .... [TIhis
body of our habeas jurisprudence makes clear that a claim
of 'actual innocence' is not itself a constitutional claim, but
instead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must
pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim con-
sidered on the merits" 63 This language ostensibly would
allow capital defense attorneys to reach a federal habeas
court in cases in which the defense discovers that the pros-
ecution suppressed evidence in violation of Brady and is
denied access to the state courts to present this new evi-
dence.
Citing the availability of executive clemency, the Court
claimed that Texas defendants are not left without a forum
in which to raise claims of actual innocence.6 However,
Texas's clemency statute is distinguishable from that of
Virginia. It allows, in capital cases, requests for a full pardon,
a commutation of a death sentence to life imprisonment or
appropriate maximum penalty, or a reprieve of execution.
6 5
The Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles makes recommen-
dations regarding clemency to the Governor, who possess-
es the ultimate authority to make clemency determinations.
Thus, notwithstanding questions about whether clemency
is the best mechanism for making guilt/innocence determi-
nations in capital cases, clemency, at least in the abstract,
offers death row inmates inTexas the realistic possibility of
exoneration and release. Although Virginia's clemency
statute grants the Governor an almost unlimited power to
determine the exact contours of a clemency agreement, in
practice, the potential for clemency in Virginia is only the
potential for a new prison sentence, not exoneration or
release.6 Thus, the Herrera Court's claim that, "the tradi-
tional remedy for claims of innocence based on new evi-
dence, discovered too late in the day to file a new trial
motion, has been executive clemency; is inapplicable in
Virginia, where clemency in practice does not provide a
realistic possibility of exoneration or release. 7 The histori-
cal practice of Virginia's Governors in granting clemency,
6"1d. at 400.
'3Id. at 404.
aHerrera, 506 U.S. at 411.
'lid. at 416. See 37 TEx.ADMIN. CODE, §§ 143.1. 143.43, and
143.57 (West Supp. 1992).
"Article V, Section 12, of the Constitution of Virginia and
Virginia Code Section 53.1-229 vest power in the Governor to
grant clemency. See infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the five cases in which Virginia's Governors have
granted clemency to death row inmates since the reinstatement of
the death penalty.
6"Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417.
coupled with the unparalleled oppressiveness of the 21 Day
Rule, provides an arguable basis for distinguishing and find-
ing Virginia law insufficient to protect innocent death row
inmates from execution.
Finally, a careful reading of Herrera yields a rather
promising fact: a majority of the justices indicated that a
condemned prisoner who could make an adequate show-
ing would be entitled to federal relief. Most of the justices
stated that Herrera simply could not make an adequate
showing, regardless of the standard employed.The majority
stated:
We may assume, for the sake of argument in
deciding this case, that in a capital case a truly
persuasive demonstration of "actual inno-
cence" made after trial would render the exe-
cution of a defendant unconstitutional, and
warrant federal habeas relief if there were no
state avenue open to process such a claim.
But because of the very disruptive effect that
entertaining claims of actual innocence
would have on the need for finality in capital
cases, and the enormous burden that having
to retry cases based on often stale evidence
would place on the States, the threshold
showing for such an assumed right would
necessarily be extraordinarily high.The show-
ing made by petitioner in this case falls short
of any such threshold."
Justice O'Connor, who concurred and was joined by
Justice Kennedy, stated, "I cannot disagree with the funda-
mental legal principle that executing the innocent is incon-
sistent with the Constitution.69 Nonetheless, she concluded
that Herrera's affidavits "purporting to show his innocence
were utterly unconvincing and that he was "not innocent, in
any sense of the word"70 Justice O'Connor continued," [o]f
course, the Texas courts would not be free to turn petition-
er away if the Constitution required otherwise. But the
District Court did not hold that the Constitution required
them to entertain petitioner's claim. On these facts, that
would be an extraordinary holding."
71
With the language quoted above, the Court indicated
that a showing that meets or surpasses the threshold show-
ing would trigger a constitutional claim.Virginia procedure
does not enable a death row inmate to make a threshold
showing if proof of actual innocence is developed more
than 21 days after the entry of final judgment.Although the
Court narrowly tailored its decision to address one particu-
lar question-whether a proffer of evidence of actual
innocence entitles a death row inmate to federal habeas
relief-the Court's language strongly suggests that the




7'Herrera, 506 U.S. at 425.
procedural rules designed to prevent actually innocent
death row inmates from presenting evidence of that inno-
cence and, thus, to ensure their execution.
2. Standards of Decency in Virginia
The United States Constitution and the Supreme Court,
in its interpretation of the Constitution, prescribe the bare
minimum of procedure that is required by the most basic
concepts of fundamental fairness and decency. Again,
Virginia stands alone as the only state in the country that
denies condemned prisoners access to a state court to pre-
sent new evidence of innocence after 21 days. The
Constitution of Virginia should offer Virginians more than
the base line of protection afforded by the United States
Constitution. Capital defense counsel should urge state
courts to strike the 21 Day Rule on independent state law
grounds, which, as always, are based on standards of decen-
cy as embodied by the Constitution of Virginia. 2
3. Clemency Doesn't Cut It- The Courts Must
Make Innocence Relevant
Proponents of the 21 Day Rule often argue that clemen-
cy, alone, offers sufficient protection to innocent death row
inmates.Article V, Section 12, of the Constitution of Virginia
vests the power to commute capital punishment in the
Governor. Virginia Code Section 53.1-229 echoes that pro-
vision in granting to the Governor the power to commute
capital punishment. Since the reinstatement of the death
penalty,Virginia's Governors have granted clemency to only
five inmates. Former Democratic Governor L. Douglas
NWilder granted conditional clemency to three death row
inmates-Earl Washington, Herbert Bassette, and Joseph
Giarratano. v" Former Governor George Allen, a Republican,
7Article I, Section 11, of the Constitution ofVirginia guarantees,
"[tihat no person shall be deprived of his life, liberty, or property
without due process of law."Article I, Section 8, provides that in
criminal prosecutions,"[a man] shall not be deprived of life or lib-
erty, except by the law of the land or the judgment of his peers....
See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Supreme Court of Illinois's decision in People v. Washington. The
court found a substantive and procedural due process right in the
state constitution which the Supreme Court of the United States had
not found in the United States Constitution, noting,"we labor under
no self-imposed constraint to follow federal precedent in'lockstep."
Washington, 665 N.E.2d at 1335.
7"See Jackson & Arney, supra note 2 at 9. Joseph Giarratano
accepted Governor Wilder's conditional clemency agreement,
which provided that Giarratano would serve life in prison with the
possibility of parole and that Giarratano could ask then-Attorney
General Mary SueTerry to petition the court for a new trial so that
he might present his new evidence and claims of innocence in
court.Joseph Williams, Michael Hardy, & Mike Allen, Wilder Spares
Giarratano's Life, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Feb. 20, 1991,
available in 1991 WL 4742020. Terry (who served as the
Democratic nominee for Governor of Virginia several years later)
refused Giarratano's request. According to one news account,
Terry stated, inexplicably,"[i]f they had anything substantial,'they
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granted conditional clemency to Joseph P. Payne, Sr., and
William Ira Saunders.7 4 None of the five inmates was exon-
erated or released, and all five men remain in prison.
The availability of executive clemency does not mili-
tate in support of the 21 Day Rule. First of all, the theoreti-
cal availability of this remedy does not justify Virginia's
courts' abdication of their responsibility to ensure that cap-
won't need to come to the attorney general.They'll come straight
to the appeals court'" Joseph Williams, Attorney General Turns
Down Giarratano's Plea for New Trial, RICHMOND TIMES-DIS-
PATCH, Feb. 21, 1991, at 7, available in 1991 WIL 4742207. In
Herbert Bassette's case, Governor Wider's concerns about "the
presence of a reasonable doubt," led him to commute Bassette's
sentence from death to life without parole. Peter Hardin and Jim
Mason, Wilder Spares Bassette from Electric Chair, RICHMOND
NEWS LEADER, Jan. 23,1992, at 2, available in 1992 WL 7685729.
In 1994, Governor Wilder granted conditional clemency to Earl
Washington,Jr., commuting his death sentence to life with the pos-
sibility of parole. Wilder granted him clemency in response to
what constituted newly discovered evidence of Washington's
innocence: a DNA test which excluded Washington as the perpe-
trator in the rape and murder of a woman who, before her death,
stated that a lone black male had attacked her.Washington, a brain-
damaged farmhand, faced a choice between accepting Governor
Wilder's stipulation of life in prison with the possibility of parole
or rejecting Governor Wilder's offer in the hope that the legisla-
ture would pass Delegate Woodrum's bill to allow for the presen-
tation of newly discovered evidence of innocence by death row
inmates. He accepted GovernorWilder's offer, and the Senate ulti-
mately rejected the bill. See Joe Jackson, Earl Washington Jr in
Prisonfor Life, but DNA Evidence Proved Innocence, VIRGINIAN-
PILOT & LEDGER-STAR, June 26, 1994, available in 1994 WIL
6610601 & Lynn Waltz, Washington Accepts Deal for Life: Wilder
Decision to Commute Death Sentence May Damage Inmate's
Chance forNew Trial, VIRGINIAN-PILOT & LEDGER-STAR,Jan. 15,
1994, available in 1994 WL 6145667. See also supra notes 17-22.
74The Governor granted clemency to Payne on account of his
concerns regarding the reliability of some of the evidence against
Payne. Four of the jurors, along with the victim's mother, had
expressed doubts concerning Payne's guilt based upon newly dis-
covered evidence.The agreement required Payne to serve life in
prison and agree not to seek a new trial. See Frank Green, Law
GivesAllen Latitude on Clemency But He Has Little Guidance as
Execution Nears, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Nov. 7, 1996,
available in 1996 WL 2315668; Frank Green, Governor Spares
Payne: Death Was Just 3 Hours Away, RICHMOND TIMES-DIS-
PATCH, Nov. 8, 1996, available in 1996 WL 2315952; & Frank
Green, Clemency Came With Promises: Payne Vows No New Trial,
No Royalties, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Nov. 9, 1996, avail-
able in 1996 WL 2316055. In 1997, Governor Allen commuted
Saunders' death sentence to a sentence of life in prison in
response to requests from the prosecutor and the trial judge.The
evidence suggests that Saunders' trial was marked by substantial
procedural problems. See Laura LaFay, Governor Commutes
Killer's Death Sentence: Judge, Prosecutor Petition Allen,
ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, Sept. 16, 1997, available in
1997 WI. 7304134 & Frank Green, Felon Becomes Familiar
Witness: Testimony Results in Both Life, Death Decisions, RICH-
MOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Nov. 10, 1997, available in 1997 WL
7634605.
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ital defendants receive not only technically fair trials, but
also justice. Historically, the administration of justice in
criminal cases is a task that has rested exclusively with the
judiciary. Trained judicial officers are much better
equipped to gauge the reliability, relevance, and signifi-
cance of new evidence. And, in fact, when the legislature
deprives the courts of their ability to perform that task, it
precludes them from fulfilling their primary responsibili-
ties to weigh evidence in individual cases and actualize the
promise of justice for all. While preventing the execution
of innocent people is about justice, executive clemency, in
its traditional conception, is about mercy.7 In this context,
the concept of mercy applies only in combination with
some element of wrongfulness or guilt; it has no applica-
tion in the case of an innocent person who has been
wrongly convicted and sentenced to death. Thus, this
reliance upon clemency and the Governor's potential for
mercy is philosophically misguided.
Secondly, the dynamics of death penalty politics dic-
tate that an elected executive officer should not be given
the power to determine whether a death row inmate
should live or die. Many external, inappropriate factors
inevitably influence a Governor's determination of
whether sufficient evidence exists to question a defen-
dant's guilt and cancel an execution. When the life of a
potentially innocent person is in the balance, factors
such as a Governor's political party affiliation, recent
approval ratings, or future political aspirations should
not interfere. Yet, the reality of death penalty politics
indicates that if the legislature leaves in place the 21 Day
Rule and continues to strip the judiciary of its responsi-
bility to address legitimate questions about the guilt and
innocence of the men and women sentenced to death,
those very factors will continue to drive Governors'
clemency decisions and will result in the loss of inno-
cent life at the hands of the Commonwealth.
Finally, the history of executive clemency since the
reinstatement of the death penalty in Virginia has shown
that, even when granted to prevent the Commonwealth's
execution of an innocent death row inmate, clemency con-
stitutes an incomplete remedy. Although substantial ques-
tions regarding innocence have prompted Virginia's
Governors to grant clemency to five death row inmates,
none of the inmates has been declared innocent, freed from
prison, or given an opportunity to present new evidence of
innocence in court.When faced with compelling evidence
of death row inmates' innocence or, at least, substantial
questions regarding their guilt, Virginia's Governors have
responded, at most, by commuting their death sentences to
"This observation concerning the insufficiency of
"clemency" as the only mechanism for sparing the life of an
actually innocent defendant is made notwithstanding the
Supreme Court's treatise on mercy in Herrera, which frames
clemency as a traditional and logically consistent mechanism
for correcting errors made by courts in sentencing innocent
people to death.
sentences of life imprisonment. This general failure to pro-
vide fair and just dispositions to wrongly convicted, inno-
cent death row inmates is without exception. 76Additionally,
Virginia law provides no forum in which the evidence that
compels a Governor to commute a death sentence may be
heard and no mechanism for the exoneration or release of
prisoners whose death sentences have been commuted.
Executive clemency, thus, represents a fundamentally unsat-
isfying alternative from the standpoint of an innocent per-
son wrongly convicted of capital murder in Virginia.
B. The Price of Our Misguided Confidence in
the Accuracy of the Criminal Justice System
1. The National Track Record
Virtually no one contests that in this century, the United
States has convicted and executed people who were factually
innocent of the charges for which they were sentenced to die.
Commentators who are honest and informed disagree only as
to the prevalence of such errors and their horrific conse-
quences.A study released in 1987 by Professor Adam Bedau of
Tufts University and Professor Michael Radelet of the University
of Florida documented three hundred and fifty known cases in
this century in which innocent defendants were wrongly con-
victed of "potentially capital" crimes, including twenty three
cases in which the defendants were executed.' In 1996,
Professors Bedau and Radelet, along with Professor William E
Lofquist of SUNY-Geneseo,published their finding that between
1970 and 1995,"one death row inmate [was] released because
of innocence for every five inmates executed?78
In 1993, the United States House Judiciary Committee
released a report which documented that 52 people had
been released from death rows nationwide since 1972.
79
The report revealed:
Some of these men were convicted on the basis of
perjured testimony or because the prosecutor
improperly withheld exculpatory evidence. In
other cases, racial prejudice was a determining fac-
7See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
'Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of
Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REv. 21 (1987).
"Michael L. Radelet,William S. Lofquist, & Hugo Adam Bedau,
Prisoners Released From Death Rows Since 1970 Because of
DoubtsAbout Their Guilt, 13 T.M. COOLEY L. REv. 907,916 (1996).
The authors included a lengthy appendix which documented the
details surrounding the conviction and ultimate exoneration of 68
men released from death row since 1970.They noted that since
their publication went to press, the total had risen to 70.Id. at 962
(n. 51). See also Michael L. Radelet, Hugo Adam Bedau, &
Constance Putnam, IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE, 1992.
"9STAFF OFTHE SUBCOMM. ON Civ.AND CONST. RIGHTS, OF THE HOUSE
COMM. ONTHEJUDICIARY, 103RD CONG. 1 REPORT ON INNOCENCEAND THE
DEATH PENALTY: ASSESSING THE DANGER OF MISTAKEN EXECUTIONS
(Subcomm. Print 1993).
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tor. In others, defense counsel failed to conduct the
necessary investigation that would have disclosed
exculpatory information."
The Committee further stated, "[i]nnocent persons
are still being sentenced to death, and the chances are
high that innocent persons have been or will be execut-
ed.""' The report indicated that although Florida, Georgia,
and Texas (among others) released many death row
inmates during the time period studied, Virginia had not
freed any inmates after reviewing new evidence. 2
These studies militate in favor of the conclusion that,
as a general proposition, the rate of wrongful conviction
of capital defendants nationwide is alarmingly high.These
studies do not, in any sense, form the basis for the con-
clusion that all innocent, wrongly convicted death row
inmates are ultimately spared the egregious injustice of
execution-they do not show that the system always
works. Instead, in addition to showing that some innocent
capital defendants are wrongly convicted, they further
indicate that some innocent death row inmates are exon-
erated and freed while others remain on death row and
ultimately are executed. As the House Report's authors
themselves concluded, "[jiudging by past experience, a
substantial number of death row inmates are indeed inno-
cent and there is a high risk that some of them will be
executed 8 3 Finally, these studies demonstrate that the
notion of the wrongly convicted, innocent death row
inmate, far from representing a mere construct of death
penalty opponents, has a corresponding reality that
should frighten, anger, and mobilize all Americans.
These conclusions are even more disturbing in the
context of Virginia's criminal justice system and the 21
Day Rule. Virginia's record is "better" than that of Illinois
and other states not because Virginia's prosecutors and
police err or cheat less than prosecutors and police
nationwide nor because Virginia's infinitely superior
criminal justice system has a 100 percent accuracy rate.
Instead, Virginia has a self-executing mechanism for con-
cealing and cleansing the system of any hint of error or
inaccuracy. Virginia's scheme of statutes and court rules,
in its present form, renders impossible the sort of sys-
temic self-correction described above. Virginia's system
does not facilitate or even merely allow the discovery of
evidence indicative of guilt or innocence, such as per-
jured testimony, suppressed evidence, or definitive sci-
entific proof. In Virginia, such evidence is kept out of the
courts and relegated to the realm of rumor and innuen-
do so as to preclude any meaningful public debate about




83See supra note 79 at 19.
2. Innocent Death Row Inmates in Virginia?
Why We'll Never Know
The House Report highlighted the case of Roger Keith
Coleman and noted that Virginia had executed Coleman
despite the persistence of serious doubts concerning his
guilt. Coleman was executed on May 20, 1992, for the 1981
rape and murder of his sister-in-lawY' In the months, weeks,
and days leading to Coleman's execution, his defense coun-
sel, who was barred by the 21 Day Rule from presenting
new evidence of innocence to the Virginia state courts,
used the media to disseminate information concerning evi-
dence of Coleman's innocence. The media discussed the
evidence at issue: Theresa Horn's statement that another
man had bragged about committing the crimes while he
tried to rape Horn in 1987; statements from two more
women which echoed Horn's account and identified the
man as Donney Ramey (a man who lived in a home direct-
ly behind the home of the victim); conflicting interpreta-
tions of DNA test results; and the statement of a local man
whose son was friends with Ramey and his brother. That
man claimed that several days after the murder he had
found in his pickup truck a plastic bag which contained a
bloody sheet, a flashlight, a pair of scissors, and two cowboy
shirts. His wife reported the find to a county sheriff, who
never pursued the lead'
The House Report noted that although news reports had
indicated that Coleman's final appeal to the Supreme Court
marked his 16th visit to court, Coleman's attorney's failure to
file his appeal in a timely manner was fatal to his ability to
raise substantive issues in both federal and state court."
Finally, the Report stated, "[i]nstead, Coleman's innocence
was debated only in the news media, and considerable doubt
concerning his guilt went with him to his execution.""'
If Coleman had lived in Illinois, he most likely would
have been permitted to present his newly discovered evi-
dence of innocence in a court. It is quite possible that the
court would have denied Coleman's claims and sent him
back to death row to await his execution.Another possible
scenario is that after granting Coleman an evidentiary hear-
ing, the court would have found his claims compelling and
granted him a new trial. Either scenario is preferable to the
one that played out in Virginia in the days leading to
Coleman's execution. His impending execution attracted
the attention of national newspapers and magazines and
'For an in-depth examination of Coleman's case up to his last-
minute declarations of innocence, see John C. Tucker, MAY GOD
HAVE MERCY, (1997).
"David G. Savage, Virginian Nears Execution Despite Doubt
About Guilt, LOS ANGELES TIMES, May 13, 1992, available in
1992 WL 2915220.
8'The House Report explained that news accounts of the
number of times that a particular case has been appealed are often
misleading because "the legal system becomes locked in a battle
over procedural issues rather than an examination of guilt or inno-
cence' See supra note 79 at 13.
WId.
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the condemnation of international figures, including the
Pope.' While the media debated the new evidence prof-
fered by the defense, the Commonwealth moved forward
with its plans for Coleman's execution. If Virginia had
allowed Coleman a chance to present the new evidence of
his innocence in a court, it is unlikely that the execution
would have drawn, first, the attention and, ultimately, the
condemnation of numerous media commentators and
national and world leaders that attended news of Coleman's
execution."9
C. Pride and Prejudice: Virginia's Reputation in
the Balance
Many national figures and organizations have joined the
efforts of local groups like Murder Victims' Families for
Reconciliation to urge Virginia's legislators to repeal the 21
Day Rule.This Rule has earned Virginia a reputation nation-
wide as a bloodthirsty state that ignores the mandates of
due process and exhibits a marked indifference towards the
possibility of executing innocent people. One local news-
paper article noted with respect to the 21 Day Rule," [ilt is
a legal Catch-22 that has led experts to call Virginia the
worst state in the nation for both unfair trials and a lack of
due process protection - even when considerable doubt
concerning an inmate's guilt is found."9 Sister Helen
Prejean, inVirginia to lobby on behalf of allowing convicted
murderer Joseph O'Dell to present what she deemed evi-
dence of his innocence, commented, "[tihere's no way to
present the evidence to the court because Virginia has this
incredible 21-day rule which says that if you don't present
evidence in 21 days, they'll let an innocent guy die. That's
83Pope Tried to Block Execution, RICHMOND TIMES-DIS-
PATCH, May 22, 1992, available in 1992 WL 7702390.
The subsequent executions of Dennis Stockton and Joseph
Roger O'Dell provoked similar debates within the media. O'Dell's
execution drew the condemnation of many national and interna-
tional figures.
"See Jackson & Arney, supra note 2 at 5.
just atrocious when you think of it."9' Jodi Longo, the direc-
tor of the Mid-Atlantic Region of Amnesty International USA
(a group which has argued for the repeal of the 21 Day
Rule), noted,"the state of Virginia is noticeably reluctant to
concede that the criminal justice system is liable to human
error."92 In fact, Virginia's death penalty proponents should
join its opponents in working steadfastly towards the repeal
of this law, which de-legitimizes Virginia's capital punish-
ment scheme in the eyes of the nation and the world and
mocks "justice."93
IV. Conclusion
The injustice of the 21 Day Rule is somewhat obscured
by the substance of the law, itself. By precluding defendants
from introducing newly discovered evidence of innocence
in a formal setting, the Commonwealth forecloses questions
about the accuracy and "justice" of its criminal justice sys-
tem.A comparative study of Virginia's capital justice scheme
and that of Illinois, however, reveals the chilling truth: if the
21 Day Rule has not yet caused the death of an innocent
person, it will.
9'Carrie Johnson, Rethinking the Death -Penalty: Nun Says
Education Would Change Minds, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH,
Sept. 23, 1996, at 3, available in 1996WL 2311516.
9Frank Green, Execution of Stockton Carried Out: Convicted
Killer Dies By Lethal Injection, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH,
Sept. 28, 1996, at 7,available in 1995 WL 2528611.
9The implications of the 21 Day Rule are even more egre-
gious and shocking in the context of the poor quality of legal rep-
resentation provided to indigent defendants in Virginia. Virginia
"leads" the nation in the minute size of the pittance that it pays pri-
vate attorneys to represent indigent criminal defendants. See gen-
erally Laura LaFay, Virginia's Poor Receive Justice on the Cheap:
Rock-Bottom Pay for Court-Appointed Lawyers Undermines
System, Lawyer Says,VIRGINIAN- PILOT & LEDGER-STAR, Feb. 15,
1998, available in 1998 WL 5536744.This statistic and the corre-
sponding reality of capital representation in Virginia have led
experts to single out the Commonwealth's capital justice system
as particularly lacking in base-line Constitutional protections.
